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HUMAN RIGHTS TALK... AND
SELF-DETERMINATION, TOO!
Manuel Rodrfguez-Orellana*
I. IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS BORGES
In one of our many conversations over the years, Professor Mary
Ann Glendon, a comparatist by conviction, shared with me her inter-
est in expanding her field of intellectual inquiry to international law,
specifically, the human rights area. Inspired by Professor Glendon's
example, as a law professor in the United States I had already availed
myself of comparative legal analysis to introduce American students to
the study of international law and institutions.
In fact, I even developed at Northeastern University-with the pa-
tient, decisive, and unobtrusive support of my former dean, DanielJ.
Givelber-an experimental 12-credit course on International and
Comparative Law from a human rights perspective.' Mary Ann Glen-
* Secretary, North American Relations of the Puerto Rican Independence Party;
Adjunct Professor of Law, School of Law of the Inter-American University of Puerto
Rico; former Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. A.B. The
Johns Hopkins University 1970; MA. Brown University 1972;J.D. Boston College Law
School 1975; LL.M. Harvard Law School 1983.
1 International and Comparative Aspects of Family Law, Northeastern University
School of Law (summer 1987). The course exposed students to the basic concepts of
international law development, leading to its manifestations in international human
rights, where the institution of the family has become a subject of human rights law.
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 8 & 12 (entered into force in
1970); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 23 & 24, GA. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316/Annex (1966)
(entered into force in 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights, arts. 10 & 11, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 & (XXI), Annex (entered
into force in 1976); American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 4, 17-19, Nov. 22,
1969, OEA/ser. A/16 (entered into force in 1978); Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, princ. VII, Aug. 1, 1975 (Helsinki Accords). Ba-
sic notions of Family Law were covered from a Comparative Law perspective in this
course, which also entailed travel to the Republic of Nicaragua for two weeks. In
1987, Nicaragua had just established a new constitution with specific provisions pro-
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don, from her office at Harvard Law School, provided the stimulus,
wisdom, and enthusiastic advice which this endeavor required. Thus,
I was not surprised when Kenlyn Flipse, the outgoing editor for this
Propter Honoris Respectum edition of the Notre Dame Law Review wrote,
in August 1997, that Professor Glendon was currently writing on inter-
national human rights.
Back in 1987, when I first sought her advice and support as an
"outside" scholar for my Comparative and International Law project, I
presented my plan through the metaphor of human rights as the aleph
for a holistic approach to International and Family Law. I chose the
aleph, not because of its standard meaning,2 but in reference to the
short story by the erudite Argentinian writer, Jorge Luis Borges. The
story told of a precise point on the nineteenth step of the basement
stairs in a friend's house in which all of the universe was simultane-
ously visible, "all of cosmic space, without reduction in size," where
"[e]ach thing . . . was infinite things" which could be clearly seen
"from all points of the universe."3 For Borges, that "gigantic instant"
was one in which he saw "millions of atrocious or delightful acts."4 It
was a singularly amazing moment because everything "occupied the
same point, without being superimposed or transparent.
' 5
The slightly less grandiose approach I selected for my law school
project worked to convince Professor Glendon to become an advisor,
not because she might have believed me; in fact, she might have
thought-as did Borges of his friend in the story-that I was "mad." I
suspected then that she accepted because Borges was the point of con-
tact, slightly over a decade earlier, for the friendship which began
when I first met her as my teacher at Boston College Law School dur-
ing her course, "Law and Social Change: Family Law in Transition."
Notwithstanding the madness in my method, I surmised that she prob-
ably felt that her commitment to cross-disciplinary studies was some-
tecting the rights of the family. A "field" component called for meetings with legisla-
tors, policy-makers, government officials, attorneys, law students, and law professors to
study and discuss the wide-ranging international consultation process which had pre-
ceded the adoption and implementation of the 1987 constitution and its new policies.
2 "The first letter of the Hebrew alphabet, a neutral vowel: various diacritical
marks determine its sound." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DIcrIoNARY, (2d
ed. 1983).
3 JORGE L. BORGES, EL ALEPH 192 (Madrid 1997). The story appears in a collec-
tion of short stories of the same name, originally published in 1949. This Spanish
edition corresponds to the one revised by Borges himself and published in Buenos
Aires, Argentina, in 1974 (All translations from Spanish throughout this article are
mine.).
4 Id. at 191-92.
5 Id. at 194.
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how responsible for my insistence in my project, since her enthusiasm
for a broader understanding of law and society was, like reading
Borges, contagious and incurable.
Now, more than a decade after my Borges-inspired plea, I know.
Mary Ann Glendon has confessed to being "hooked on comparative
legal studies" for none of the "usual pragmatic justifications ....
Whatever prompts one's original step across the margins, what grips
and holds people is one of the most powerful drives known to the
human species: the unrestricted desire to know."
'6
As Mary Ann Glendon now promotes interest in human rights
through her teaching and writing, one may expect richer vintages in
the future from what she terms "the 'aha' experience-the major and
minor flashes of understanding that seemingly pop into one's mind
out of nowhere." 7 Inevitably, my respect and admiration for her will
deepen as she, in Borgian fashion, sails towards "the horizon of
human knowledge [which] recedes as the mind approaches it."8
II. SHOOTING FROM THE MARGINS
Professor Glendon has written that cross-disciplinary scholarship
carries "the risk of being regarded by one's peers with indifference or
a certain amount of suspicion" and, having "strayed across the mar-
gins of several fields.... [being] regarded as neither fish nor fowl." °
She also knows "how scholars who began by writing across the margins
can ultimately rewrite the page and relocate the margins" 0 -all of
which brings out the Borges that lurks within.
Borges" had already reflected on the complications of a problem
considered earlier by T.S. Eliot regarding the "historical sense" of an
author compelled to write "with his own generation in his bones," and
the notion that all literature is imbued with a simultaneous order and
existence. 12 According to Arturo Echavarria, an eminent scholar from
the University of Puerto Rico, for Eliot
[t] he existing order is complete before a new work arrives; for order
to be preserved once the novel work is superimposed, all of the ex-
6 Mary Ann Glendon, Why Cross Boundaries', 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 971, 974
(1996) (footnote omitted).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 971.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 972.
11 JORGE L. BORGES, El escritor argentino y la tradicidn (Discusidn), in I OBRAS COM-
PLETAS 267 (1989).
12 T.S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in CR=rIsM: THE MAJOR TExTS
525 (WalterJackson Bate ed., 1952).
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isting order will be, even if slightly, altered; and in this fashion, a
work of art's relationships, proportions, and values become read-
justed with respect to the whole; and it is this readjustment of the
system which serves as a foundation for the conformation between
the new and the old.
13
For Borges, however, the network of relationships is com-
pounded when trying to ascertain the existence of an autochthonous
literary tradition. He ponders whether an autochthonous order al-
ready exists, or whether the writer must resort to a "foreign" order in
which his work must be inserted, 14 and he opts for the latter.
To Europeans, prior to the economic, legal, and political devel-
opments leading to current unification efforts, "European culture"
was a foreign notion. It would have been deemed unessential for a
European to possess a broad and detailed knowledge of the history,
literature, and art of any country, other than his own, to be consid-
ered "cultured." This led Borges to say of Latin Americans, "We are
the true Europeans. 'u 5
Borges did not intend to demean the role of autochthonous
populations in the development of the sociological distinctness of
Latin American nations. He meant that, to be considered "cultured,"
Latin Americans would be required to possess a relatively detailed
knowledge of the cultural codes of at least continental European
countries, if not beyond. 16 Thus Borges-writing from the margins of
a European's culture-concludes that for Argentina (a metaphor for
Latin America), "Our legacy is the universe.
1 7
III. LAWYERING FROM THE MARGINS
Borges' cri de coeur from the cultural margins of Latin America
reminds me of Mary Ann Glendon's endeavors in the legal profession.
An impeccably trained lawyer and cultured legal scholar, she came
out of the pages of classical legal education in the United States and
Europe. Yet, for someone like Professor Glendon, "with her own gen-
eration in her bones," traditional law practice would be intellectually
confining.1 8 Consequently, "hard core" subjects, like Property, Torts,
13 Arturo Echavarria, Amndrica y (en) Europa: Borges y la tradici6n literaria, in I CON-
JURADOs: ANUARIO BORGIANO 55, 56 (1996).
14 Id. at 57.
15 Id. at 58 (describing conversation between Jorge L. Borges and Puerto Rican
Borgian scholar, Arturo Echavarria).
16 Id. at 58-59.
17 "Nuestro patrimonio es el universo." BORGEs, supra note 11, at 274.
18 Much of this shines through in her rational and passionate book on the law
profession and the legal system in the United States, MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION
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Tax Law, Corporations, or Contracts-and she has taught them all-
began to look more interesting when viewed from the margins of law
practice through the keyhole of legal education. Moreover, her forays
in comparative law have greatly contributed to changing the text of
American legal scholarship and making it richer by relocating its
margins.
Her work demonstrates what I like to call "off-center" scholarship
which, having changed the text from the margins, becomes "innova-
tive." It provides impeccable evidence of an analytical but creative
mind in search of ever more moments of "aha,"'9 and this is undoubt-
edly the right time for an endless page-navigator like Professor Glen-
don to seek again and to explore the new margins of human rights
law.
IV. OLD RIGHTS AND NEW MARGINS
Human rights are as old as recorded history. Numerous philo-
sophical and legal precedents can be found in the history of Western
civilization-from the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, through the
Greeks, the Romans, and the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X of Spain, to
the Irish Celtic Book of Aicill the English Magna Carta, the European
Enlightenment, the American, French, Mexican, and Russian Revolu-
tions, and the international law treaties and covenants that have pro-
liferated since the Second World War.20
UNDER LAWYERS: How THE Cmisis IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMEI-
CAN SOCIETY (1994). A random sampler:
One ex-con facing an armed robbery charge, however, tried to revoke his
choice [to have a volunteer from the bar association] when I showed up to
represent him. He wanted a real lawyer, not some girl who was obviouslyjust
out of law school. He was very annoyed when the judge refused his request,
and disappointed again when [a co-counsel] and I declined his invitation to
represent him further after securing a not guilty verdict for him.
Id. at 62. "According to a Johns Hopkins University survey, lawyers are more than
three times as likely to suffer from symptoms of depression as adults among the gen-
eral population." Id. at 87. "How did it come about that, within a decade [from her
law school years] professional training, the scholarly quest for truth, and the law itself
began to lose their appeal among law professors?" Id. at 198.
19 Among my personal favorites of her work are the eye-opening RIGHTS TALK:
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLrcTIAL DISCOURSE (1991), and the first edition of her
casebook with co-authors Michael Wallace Gordon and Christopher Osakwe, CoMPAR-
ATiVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (1985) because it dared explore the legal process and meth-
ods of a fledgling socialist legal tradition arising from the Bolschevik Revolution in
Russia, in the midst of the Reagan years' swan song of the "Evil Empire."
20 Carlos I. Gorrin-Peralta, Human Rights: Individual and Collective Freedom for the
Satisfaction of Human Needs, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAw AND POLICY STUDIES 109, 110-11
(1995).
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Major law schools in the United States have offered courses and
seminars on human rights law for approximately two decades.
Casebooks and hornbooks on the subject have captured their corner
of the market. International institutions like the Inter-American Com-
mission of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human
Rights handle ever more cases with varying degrees of compliance and
success. Yet, in spite of this advancement, I would still characterize
the field of human rights as ideal for Professor Glendon's new en-
deavor from the margins.
The centrality-of-law culture inherited by Western civilization
from the Romans is scaling back to a supporting role in today's multi-
polar, multicivilizational world. According to Samuel P. Huntington,
"culture and cultural identities ... are shaping the patterns of cohe-
sion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world."2' As
Huntington points out:
A universal civilization requires universal power. Roman power cre-
ated a near-universal civilization within the limited confines of the
Classical world. Western power in the form of European colonial-
ism in the nineteenth century and American hegemony in the twen-
tieth century extended Western culture throughout much of the
contemporary world. European colonialism is over; American he-
gemony is receding.
22
During the 1970s and 1980s, the world observed a "wave of transi-
tions" from authoritarian to allegedly democratic political systems.
23
According to Huntington:
These transitions and the collapse of the Soviet Union generated in
the West, particularly in the United States, the belief that a global
democratic revolution was under way and that in short order West-
ern concepts of human rights and Western forms of political de-
mocracy would prevail throughout the world.
24
That such expectations have met with limited success should
come as no surprise. The "rule of law" which Western civilization in-
herited from the Romans laid the basis for constitutionalism and the
protection of human rights against the exercise of arbitrary power.
Huntington refers to "civilizations" as ways of life which make "crucial
21 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 20 (1996).
22 Id. at 91.
23 But see Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec.
1997, at 22 (discussing the tensions of democracy arising from the election of authori-
tarian regimes and Western concepts of constitutional liberalism).
24 HUNTINGTON, supra note 21, at 193.
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distinctions among human groups concern [ing] their values, beliefs,
institutions, and social structures, not their physical size, head shapes,
and skin colors."25 He continues:
A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the
broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which
distinguishes humans from other species....
[C]ivilizations are mortal but also very long-lived; they
evolve, adapt, and are the most enduring of human associations
26
He identifies up to nine "civilizations" which share the stage in
the post-Cold War world: Sinic (Chinese), Japanese, Hindu, Islamic,
Western (a term which he admits is somewhat ethnocentric), Latin
American, African, Orthodox, and Buddhist.27 Western civilization,
which emerged in the eighth and ninth centuries, did not develop its
unique sense and tradition of individual rights and liberties until the
fourteenth or fifteenth centuries; nor did it achieve its "moderniza-
tion" until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. "The West was
the West long before it was modern. 28 As Huntington states:
Modernization involves industrialization, urbanization, increas-
ing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization, and
more complex and diversified occupational structures... [;] a revo-
lutionary process comparable only to the shift from primitive to civi-
lized societies .... As the first civilization to modernize, the West
leads in the acquisition of the culture of modernity....
It does not necessarily follow, however, that societies with mod-
ern cultures resemble each other more than societies with tradi-
tional cultures.
29
25 Id. at 42.
26 Id. at 43.
27 See id. at 26-27 (Map 1.3), 45-48.
28 Id. at 69. For a general discussion on "Modernization and Westernization," see
id. at 56-78.
29 Id. at 68. Huntington's clarification of what "modernization" is not reminds
me of an exchange I had in November 1997 with a visiting member of the New York
State Assembly. He insisted that Puerto Rico was culturally "American" because he
had visited the mountain town of Aguas Buenas hoping to find typical Puerto Rican
culture, but he found a McDonald's fast food restaurant at the town's center. Hunt-
ington would have this to say:
The argument now that the spread of pop culture and consumer goods
around the world represents the triumph of Western civilization trivializes
Western culture. The essence of Western civilization is the Magna Carta not
the Magna Mac. The fact that non-Westerners may bite into the latter has no
implications for their accepting the former.
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And he concludes: "Non-Western societies can modernize and
have modernized without abandoning their own cultures and adopt-
ing wholesale Western values, institutions, and practices.... In funda-
mental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less Western."30
Thus, with receding European and American hegemony comes
the erosion of Western culture, as modernized non-Western societies
begin to reassert themselves in a post-Cold War world where "culture
counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most
people."1'
From this perspective, then, the Western legal tradition, with its
Romano-Germanic and Anglo-American law modalities, constitutes a
small court, indeed, from which to attempt to judge or influence uni-
versal thought and behavior. This may account, in part, for the failure
to "influence" human rights practice in China, which Huntington re-
gards as "the capitulation of the United States on human rights issues
with China and other Asian powers.
' '32
Huntington's alleged "failure" of human rights in China occurs
in a civilization separate and distinct from the Western legal tradition
and value system. However, from Huntington's Western viewpoint, a
Chinese decision to go along with his views on how to act within a
legal framework of human rights would be purportedly "normal" or
"good," even if such views were not generally shared by the Chinese
people, and even if action in furtherance of a Western vision of
human rights concepts created dissidence within China.
Regardless of one's preferred outcome, the human rights prob-
lem that so bothers Huntington is in itself an example of how difficult
escaping the text can be, even for one who brilliantly documents how
Western values and traditions (of which human rights law is but a re-
cent off-shoot) are still patently on the margins of the post-Cold War
world. While Huntington himself points out the differences over
human rights notions between the West and other civilizations mani-
fest in the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights
in Vienna, he misses the broader perspective which contemplation
from the margins would have provided.
The Vienna declaration contained no explicit endorsement of
rights to freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and religion, making
Id. at 58. Evidently, my visitor friend confused "Puerto Rican culture" with "backward-
ness"; I have eaten sushi in New York and gallo pinto in Florida without confusing the
United States with either Japan or Nicaragua.
30 Id. at 78.
31 Id. at 20.
32 Id. at 194 (labeling it "unconditional surrender" on the part of the United
States).
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it, according to him, weaker in many respects than the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights of 1948. And wistful remarks by an Ameri-
can human rights supporter in Vienna reveal the problem which
Western attitudes will have to overcome:
The international human rights regime of 1945 . . . is no more.
American hegemony has eroded. Europe, even with the [unifica-
tion] events of 1992, is little more than a peninsula. The world is
now as Arab, Asian, and African as it is Western. Today the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants
are less relevant to much of the planet than during the immediate
post-World War II era.
3 3
This tends to suggest that the European and U.S. modalities of
human rights law are so focused on the text that they ignore the mar-
gins. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corre-
sponding International Covenants-to which the U.S. has been so
slow to respond 34-probably were never quite so relevant to the non-
Western parts of the planet, anyway. They were relevant in proportion
to Western hegemony over the non-Western world. If Western he-
gemony has eroded, so must the presumed relevance of Western con-
ceptions of human rights. Even then, divergent results in human
rights cases in the West itself attest to the difficulty in developing a
universalist conception of human rights law among constituent
nations.3 5
33 HUNTINGTON, supra note 21, at 196 (quoting an unnamed American human
rights supporter).
34 As of 1993, the United States, a major sponsor of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, had consented to the ratification of only three major human
rights agreements: (1) in 1989, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of 1946; (2) in 1990 (without implementing legislation), the
U.N. Convention Against Torture; and (3) in 1992, the Convention on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 came into effect
on March 23, 1976; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights of 1966 came into effect a little earlier, onJanuary 3, 1976, and has been rati-
fied by over 130 nations. The United States, however, has not ratified the latter and
ratified the former only recently, as noted above, with a number of Reservations, Un-
derstandings, and Declarations which subordinate the terms of this Covenant to U.S.
domestic lav. See 138 CONG. Rc. 4781, 4783 (1992).
35 See Glendon, A Tale of Two Cities: Belfast and Atlanta, in RIGHTS TALK, supra note
19, at 146-58 (discussing the divergent treatment afforded to homosexual behavior in
private under U.S. law in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and under interna-
tional norms of the European Convention on Human Rights in the European Com-
mission of Human Rights in Strasbourg, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EUR. H.R. REP.
149 (1981)).
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The four decades preceding the disappearance of the Soviet
Union developed a vision of international human rights law which re-
produced the ideological conflict between the socialist and non-social-
ist camps:
Much too frequently the schism ... between civil and political rights
(CPRs) on one hand and economic, social and cultural rights (ES-
CRs) on the other, is associated with the tensions between liberal
individual rights which protect liberty in its negative conception,
and the socialist version of rights geared towards the collective
welfare.3
6
With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the issues along
which civilizational lines continue to be dividing lines on human
rights can no longer be measured by the old ideological yardsticks.
The Vienna conference, however, demonstrated that human rights is-
sues would nonetheless be conceptualized in terms of cultural relativ-
ism versus universality and (still) economic and social rights versus civil
and political rights.3 7 Without the Soviet Union, the old dichotomies
can no longer be attributed to enemies of the West, lest the West wish
to recognize too many enemies on the other side of the cultural divide
which sets its margins.
Are there nevertheless any reasonable expectations or hopes for
greater success in universal application of human rights law in the
post-Cold War era? In other words, is there a way to narrow the gap
between "universality" and "cultural relativism" in order to provide a
holistic approach to the understanding and implementation of CPRs
and ESCRs? Specifically, is there an aleph-a perspective from the in-
creasingly lower-level basement of Western hegemony-from which
the law could set its eyes on "that secret and conjectural object, whose
name men usurp, but which no man has gazed upon: the inconceiv-
able universe,"38 to establish a human rights tradition, at least on this
planet?
V. JUs COGEAS
In international law, the concept of jus cogens refers to peremp-
tory norms accepted and recognized by the international community
from which no derogation is permitted, and which can only be modi-
fied by a subsequent norm of international law recognized as admit-
ting no derogation.39 Furthermore, jus cogens presupposes an
36 Gorrin-Peralta, supra note 20, at 110.
37 Id.
38 BORGES, supra note 3, at 194.
39 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, art. 53.
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international consensus powerful enough to invalidate rules upon
which some states might wish to act.
While it has been contended that "there is no general agreement
as to which rules have this character" and that the "full content of the
category of jus cogens remains to be worked out" in practice andjuris-
prudence,40 certain examples are usually advanced to illustrate this
notion. Prohibitions against slavery, piracy, torture, and genocide im-
mediately come to mind.4 ' Even though universal agreement regard-
ing these prohibitions seems self-evident, a closer look at specific
conduct illustrates how, in their application, they are more likely to be
the subject of divergent interpretations in the world's muli-civiliza-
tional and multipolar reality described by Huntington.
Flogging someone-especially an American-in a public square
in Singapore may be considered torture in the United States, while
poisoning someone to death in front of a limited audience (the death
penalty by lethal injection) may not be so regarded. The notion of
slavery may be abhorrent, yet owning an island in the Pacific whose
native inhabitants are "permanently employed" as servants-even in
decent living conditions-has been depicted as glamorous on the
Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous.42
The International Law Commission, while refraining from giving
examples of rules of jus cogens, has actually suggested that the obser-
vance of human rights itself may be part of this corpus of non-dero-
gable international law norms.43  However, the divergent
interpretations mentioned above suffice to show that to include all
human rights as part of jus cogens may be overextending the concept.
Neither corporal punishment in Singapore, nor the death penalty in
the United States, nor the extravagant opulence of the rich and fa-
mous can muster sufficient juridical consensus to qualify as abhorrent
acts admitting of no derogation.
VI. SELF-DETERMINATION
The concept of self-determination may appear more abstract
than some of the prohibitions against specific acts like torture or slav-
ery. However, the former's universally understood meaning may
40 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8 (R.Y. Jennings and A. Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992), repinted in HENmN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERus 92 (3d
ed. 1993).
41 See Id.
42 Seen in an American program broadcast several times through cable television
in Puerto Rico on "E" network in 1997.
43 See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 40, at 7-8.
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bring it closer to universal acceptance in practice and application in
the post-Cold War world than the latter. In fact, there is a relative
consensus at present to include self-determination as a basic human
right, part of jus cogens.44 Understanding why this is so may shed some
light into a process which would expand the universal appeal for the
incorporation and practice of human rights law as part of jus cogens in
a multi-civilizational world:
Self-determination is the legitimating myth for modem nation-
states. Despite its radical implications for restructuring interna-
tional political authority, the doctrine of self-determination has
functioned primarily to facilitate the breakup of colonial empires
and to validate the norm of popular consent in the disposition of
the territory. As the era of decolonization draws to a close, leaving
in its wake an increasingly pluralistic and interdependent world, the
right to self-determination is certain to be invoked in a variety of
new situations.
45
Self-determination mandates that peoples everywhere should, on
the basis of equality, have the power to determine how to govern
themselves-that is, the right of nations to be constitutionally in-
dependent.46 "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educa-
tional preparedness"-value terms normally employed by those who
would object to a colony's self-determination and independence-
"should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." 47 And,
as stated above, "all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to
44 See Id. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 515
(3d ed. 1979); Roger S. Clark, Free Association-A Critical View, in PROCEEDINGS: CON-
FERENCE ON THE FuTuRE PoLrrIcAL STATUS OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS
(1989) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]; MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 54 (1988).
45 Debra A. Valentine, Note, The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L.J. 802 (1980) (cita-
tions omitted).
46 The interdependence of peoples has been advanced as an argument to down-
grade the importance of political independence in today's world. However, the no-
tion of independence has to be placed in context as much as the notion of
interdependence. See ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SOCIETY 25, 177-79 (Paul Wilkinson ed., 1986). See also I.K. Minta, The Lom6
Convention: A Case Study of North-South Relations, 37 (1979) (unpublished thesis,
Harvard University):
The "age of interdependence" is here, but there have surely been other ages
of interdependence, such as the interdependence of colonies and mother
countries, and hegemonic powers and client states. [One could add, masters
and slaves!] The fact of interdependence does not justify the terms ....
47 G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
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determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political
statuS.
' 4 8
International law has also recognized that in certain cases a full
measure of self-government may be attained through free association
or through integration with another state.49 Free association
prescribes a delegation of functions of sovereignty while retaining the
right to end the association unilaterally. Integration requires "equal-
ity" with the rest of the population of the state with which integration
takes place. Even then a paramount right of secession arises "when
the associational right of a group to determine its political existence
conflicts with an existing state's right of noninterference .... so long
as that right of exercise of self-determination does not abridge the
rights of other groups to self-determination." 50
The principle of self-determination traces its legal origin in the
West to the concepts of nationality and democracy which evolved pri-
marily in Europe. It first appeared as a political principle after the
First World War. Despite Woodrow Wilson's efforts to include it in
the Covenant of the League of Nations, self-determination was not yet
considered a legal principle. However, it is said to have influenced
various provisions, including the establishment of the Mandates sys-
tem-a sophisticated coordination of the spoils of war-under Article
22 of the Covenant.51
48 Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Final Act (Helsinki),
Aug. 1, 1975, art. 1, princ. VIII, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1975, at 81 [hereinafter Final
Act (Helsinki)].
49 See G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1960). See also Jost TRfAs MONGE, PUERTO Rico: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDE
COLONY IN THE WORLD 141-59 (1997); Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association-
Should the United Nations Terminate The Pacific Islands Trusti, 21 HARV. INl'L L.J. 1
(1980); Clark, supra note 44; Paul M. Leary, The Historical Development of Free Association
Status in the Pacific and the Caribbean, in PROCEEDrNGs, supra note 44; Manuel Rodri-
guez-Orellana, In Contemplation of Micronesia: The Prospects for the Decolonization of Puerto
Rico Under International Law, 18 U. MIAmi INTER-AM. L. Rv. 457 (1987).
50 Valentine, supra note 45, at 803. See also LEE C. BUCHHErr, SECESSION: THE
LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATON (1978); MALcoLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
182, 215-18 (4th ed. 1997); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law:
Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. R.S. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
51 See StrAw, supra note 50, at 177. There were in all fifteen mandated territories
under the Mandate system. Those in the Middle East became independent states,
and others in Africa and the Pacific (except for South West Africa) were transferred
to the United Nations trusteeship system after the Second World War. Under both
the Mandates and the Trusteeship systems, sovereignty was vested in the people of the
territory, but exercised by the administering power presumably to promote "the well-
being and development" of the peoples and their eventual self-government or inde-
pendence. HENIUN, supra note 40, at 296-97.
i998] 1403
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The Aaland Islands case 52-probably the last event of any signifi-
cance before the Second World War with regard to this principle-
again reinforced the notion of self-determination as a political,
although not yet as a legal principle. This case, which provided mi-
nority guarantees for the Swedish inhabitants of an island which even-
tually became part of Finland, placed self-determination on track
towards becoming part of international law.
The Second World War unleashed waves of decolonization
5 3
which made deeper consideration of this principle inevitable. Accord-
ingly, the "self-determination of peoples" was among the purposes
and principles on which the Charter of the United Nations (1945) was
based,5 4 as well as the Charter's basis for post-War international eco-
nomic and social co-operation.55 While not every statement of polit-
ical principle in the Charter creates legal obligations, the inclusion of
self-determination-especially in the context of the Charter's state-
ment of purposes-placed it in a privileged position for subsequent
interpretations regarding its legal meaning and consequences.
The U.N. Charter is a multilateral treaty, and the United Nations,
created by that Charter, provided the scenario for subsequent state
practice. Spurred by the decolonization waves which have taken place
since 1945, self-determination evolved from political principle to legal
norm out of two classical sources of international law: treaty and
custom.
Resolution 1514 (XV), overwhelmingly approved by the U.N.
General Assembly in 1960,56 became the authoritative legal statement
on decolonization and self-determination. In the first two resolutory
paragraphs, it stressed that:
All Trust territories have allegedly achieved independence or self-government
within another state. The last to do so were the Strategic Trust Territories of Microne-
sia: the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and
more recently the Republic of Palau.
While the United States can hardly be said to have strictly adhered to "the well-
being and development" of the people of the islands of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap,
and Utrik in the Marshall Islands, which were mercilessly used for nuclear testing, the
Compact of Free Association did provide for some damage relief for the inhabitants.
See Rodriguez-Orellana, supra note 49, at 479-80, n.122.
52 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 4, at 8-9 (1920), in HENKIN, supra note
40, at 248.
53 See C. Fred Bergsten, Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions,
30 INT'L ORG. 361 (1976).
54 See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
55 See U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
56 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 47 (a consensus resolution adopted 89-0, with only 9
abstentions, one of which was the United States).
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1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment
to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.
57
In 1975, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that this
and other resolutions58 of the U.N. General Assembly constituted an
authoritative interpretation implementing Articles 1 and 55 of the
U.N. Charter:
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) provided the basis for the
process of decolonization .... It is complemented in certain of its
aspects by General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV).... At the same
time, certain of its provisions give effect to the essential feature of
the right of self-determination as established in resolution 1514 (XV).59
Although judicial discussion of this matter has been infrequent, a
recent decision of the International Court of Justice reaffirmed the
right of self-determination. In East Timor (Portugal v. Australia),6 0 the
ICJ declared that "Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self-
determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Na-
tions practice, as an erga omnes character, is irreproachable." 61 It fur-
ther stated that self-determination is "one of the essential principles of
contemporary international law."
62
Consonant with Resolution 1514 (XV), in 1966 the General As-
sembly adopted the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In both, an
identical first article declares, in part: "All peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
'63
57 Id. at 68.
58 E.g., G.A. Res. 1541 (XV) (Dec. 15, 1960), and G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24,
1970).
59 Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 at 32 (Oct. 16) (emphasis added). See also Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.CJ. 16 (June 21).
60 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
61 Id. at 102.
62 Id.
63 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1
and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1.
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On August 1, 1975, after two years of discussions, delegates of
thirty-five participating states, including all of Western Europe and the
United States, signed the Final Act of Helsinki. 64 The Final Act dealt
primarily with questions of international security and state relations.
Although this document would establish that the method for post-War
territorial settlement of Europe was ostensibly of a political nature,
and therefore not to be regarded as a binding treaty, its impact on
developments in Europe "has far exceeded the impact of most legally
binding treaties."
65
The Final Act adopted a declaration of principles for participat-
ing states, which included "Respect for Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms" and "Equal Rights and Self-determination of
Peoples. ' 66 The latter principle states that "participating States will
respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determina-
tion, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of
international law."'67 It adds:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to deter-
mine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political
status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish
their political, economic, social and cultural development. 68
If the 1993 Vienna Conference was a disappointment to Western
observers regarding human rights, 6 9 the reason may be attributed to
the Western, particularly the United States', attitude towards that "es-
sential principle of contemporary international law."'70 Self-determi-
nation is not only part of customary and treaty law, but also a
fundamental human right. Because it served the interests of so many
culturally diverse nations which have continued to embrace it since
the heyday of decolonization, the development of self-determination
law has become part of jus cogens and, as noted in the case of seces-
sion,71 it "is capable of developing further so as to apply to sovereign
states in various ways."'72
64 Final Act (Helsinki), supra note 48.
65 SHAW, supra note 50, at 282.
66 Final Act (Helisnki), supra note 48, at 80-81.
67 Id. at 81.
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69 See HUNTINGTON, supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
70 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 I.G.J. 90 at 102 (June 30).
71 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
72 SHAW, supra note 50, at 182.
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VII. THE UNITED STATES AND SELF-DETERMINATION
Now that Professor Glendon is again exploring new margins, I
have very good reason to believe that she will show all of us that
human rights talk about comparative law and self-determination, too.
For one thing, international law is not unknown to her. Ten years
ago, she wrote to a former colleague of mine:
Although I am a comparatist, rather than an international law spe-
cialist, I have increasingly come to believe that these two fields can-
not continue to be artificially separated from one another. The
future of international legal studies lies with persons wVho... are at
ease both with the study of foreign law and with what has tradition-
ally been called public international law. 7
3
Her unquiet heart and my irksome persistence regarding Puerto
Rico's right to self-determination exposed her to what back then ap-
peared, to American legal scholars, like "evolving international law"
which placed the political status of my country "uncomfortably close
to that of a colony. ' 74 Moreover, Puerto Rico's unresolved status will
increasingly make an encounter with the legal principle of self-deter-
mination unavoidable for Americans.
75
The U.S. government's official position on Puerto Rico was circu-
lated in a "Non-Paper on Puerto Rico" to members of the United Na-
tions Decolonization Committee in June 1997.76 Reiterating the U.S.
position since 1953, the "Non-Paper" stated:
73 Letter from Mary Ann Glendon, Learned Hand Professor of Law, Harvard Uni-
versity, to Robert W. Hallgring, Hadley Professor of Law and Chairman of the Faculty
Tenure Committee, Northeastern University School of Law (December 5, 1988)
(copy on file with author).
74 Id.
75 The literature on Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States is volumi-
nous, indeed. However, four recent publications on the subject are noteworthy. For
a superb contemporary political analysis of Puerto Rico's right to independence, see
Ruben Berrfos Martinez, Puerto Rico's Decolonization, 76 FOREIGN AiF. Nov.-Dec. 1997,
at 100. For a constitutional and historical synthesis of much of the previous and
scholarly work by the former ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and a
principal architect of Puerto Rico's failed commonwealth status, see TnfAs MONGE,
supra note 49. A provocative analysis of Puerto Rico's 1993 non-binding status refer-
endum is provided by Garcia Passalacqua, The 1993 Plebiscite in Puerto Rico: A First Step
to Decolonization, 93 CumRtEr IHisr. 103 (1994). And for an informative historical and
political account of twentieth century developments, see RoNALD FERNANDEZ, THE DiS-
ENCHANTED ISLAND: PUERTO Rico AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1992).
76 A copy of a three-page typewritten document with the heading, United States
of America, NON-PAPER ON PUERTO RICO (no date affixed), was also made avail-
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In 1953, the UN General Assembly recognized that the people of
Puerto Rico had effectively exercised their right to self-determina-
tion and achieved a new constitutional status in a mutually agreed
association with the United States which made them an autono-
mous political entity. Resolution 748 (VIII) determined that the
Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories77 could no
longer be applied to Puerto Rico and that the United States should
cease transmitting information on Puerto Rico under Article 73(e)
of the Charter, removing Puerto Rico from the list of non-self-gov-
erning territories.
78
This position was always at odds with the congressional intent be-
hind the 1950 legislation which authorized the territory of Puerto
Rico to draft a constitution for its local government administration,
subject to the approval of Congress. 79 The accompanying reports on
the bill stated:
The bill under consideration would not change Puerto Rico's fun-
damental political, social, and economic relationship to the United
States... [and the] sections of the [previously existing] organic act
which section 5 of the bill would repeal are the provisions of the act
concerned primarily with the organization of the local executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the government of Puerto Rico
and other matters of purely local concern.
80
The United States government, however, appears to recognize
that a changed world configuration requires a change in policy. In
what may be the first official admission of U.S. colonialism, a major
congressional committee considering Puerto Rico status legislation re-
ported that the existing Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act "was for the
creation of a form of local constitutional self-government, which rep-
resented progress toward, but did not fulfill or satisfy, U.N. criteria for
fall self-government constituting completion of the decolonization
process. 8 1 The Report on the bill under consideration,8 2 filed in Con-
gress the same month as the Non-Paper at the U.N., argued that "the
able to the Puerto Rican Independence Party delegation to the 1997 hearings of the
U.N. Decolonization Committee (copy on file with author).
77 This referenced declaration should not be confused with U.N. General Assem-
bly Res. 1514 (XV) of 1960, approved seven years later as the authoritative United
Nations interpretation of self-determination law, under the title Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, see supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
78 NON-PAPER ON PUERTO RICO, supra note 76.
79 Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950).
80 PUERTO RiCO-CoNSTITUTIoNAL GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZATION, 2 U.S. CONG. AND
ADMIN. SERVICE 2682-3 (1950).
81 H.R. REP. No. 105-131, at 17 (1997).
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discrepancy between the subsequent interpretation of information
provided to the U.N. by the U.S. in 1953 about Puerto Rico's new
constitutional status and the reality of Puerto Rico's status under
the U.S. federal political system has been the result of a
misunderstanding."
83
It further clarified that:
As a consequence of how international standards regarding
decolonization have evolved since 1953, and in view of how the
political branches of the Federal Government and the courts have
implemented and interpreted the "compact" for local self-govern-
ment under PRFRA, the United States has recognized that Puerto
Rico did not achieve full self-government in 1952.84
The Report concludes that "Puerto Rico's decolonization process
has not been completed as a matter of international or domestic
law."
8 5
While the world was perceived as two opposing camps, the United
States could get away with holding colonial possessions. United States
hegemony ensured that no major embarrassment would take place at
the United Nations.86 Surely colonialism was wrong, but it could be
rationalized in terms of strategic security in the context of the Cold
War. Surely, the leader of the "free world" could be forgiven a colo-
nial indiscretion so long as the colonial subjects were well-fed and civil
and political rights abuses were handled discreetly by local and U.S.
authorities, while world opinion was assertively persuaded to look the
other way.8
7
82 H.R. 856, overwhelmingly approved by the House Committee on Resources
(44-1), passed the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives on March 4, 1998, after
more than ten hours of debate, by a vote of 209 to 208. As of the time of this writing,
one "workshop" on Puerto Rico's status had been held by the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, and two more had been announced before any formal
committee action in the spring of 1998.
83 H.R. REP. No. 105-131, at 17 (1997).
84 Id. at 19. Implementation of the current commonwealth arrangement under
PRFRA occurred in 1952.'
85 Id. at 20.
86 See THOMAS M. FRANcK, NATION AGAINST NATION 195-204 (1985).
87 A wide-spread government practice of keeping dossiers on persons suspected
of being "subversives" by virtue of anticolonial or pro-independence advocacy in Pu-
erto Rico for more than 30 years was denounced by the Puerto Rican Independence
Party in 1986. The practice was theoretically discontinued after extensive litigation
amply documenting it in Noriega Rodrfguez v. Herndndez Coldn, 122 D.P.R. 650 (1988)
and 130 D.P.. __ (1992).
For a superb historical account documenting political persecution and other civil
and political rights abuses against the pro-independence forces from the late 1940s to
the late 1950s, see IvoNNE AcosTA, LA MORDAzA (1987).
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I have argued elsewhere in favor of Puerto Rico's independence
from the United States. 88 My point here is that, with the demise of the
Soviet Union, U.S. failure to comply with Puerto Rico's right to
decolonization one hundred years after its military occupation of the
island, and the slow progress in coming to terms with self-determina-
tion as the most basic of human rights in international relations, is
symptomatic of the obstacles that must be overcome. In order to
break out of the frozen mind-frame of its weakening Cold War hegem-
ony, the United States must begin to approach the new multiciviliza-
tional reality which Huntington describes by crossing the margins of
cultures in the post-Cold War world through deeper understanding
and a willingness to let self-determination law develop elsewhere by
complying with it at home. A first step is letting go of Puerto Rico.
VIII. BACK TO THE BASEMENT
Arrogance and ignorance usually travel as stowaways in the ship
of history. In the history of the United States, the arrogance of colo-
nial rule has escorted its ignorance of people's rights to self-determi-
nation in the hundred-year voyage to the harbor of the 21st century.
Professor Glendon has recognized in Puerto Rico's case "a situation
which unfortunately is almost invisible to most of us."8 9 The com-
paratist in her has seen how U.S. neglect of self-determination as a
human right has fed parochial attitudes in U.S. scholarship. "Those
of us who specialize in foreign law," she has written, "tend to ignore
Puerto Rico because we do not think of it as another 'country'; on the
other hand it escapes the notice of those who focus on domestic law
because it is not a state."90 On a broader scale, she warns:
"Indiscretions" resulting in human rights violations in Puerto Rico, however,
have occurred throughout American colonial rule. See Manuel Moraza Choisne, Some
Examples of State Terrorism Against Its Own Citizens: Puerto Rico 1937, 1948-57 (1989)
(unpublished paper, Harvard University) (copy on file with author).
88 For recent publications, see Manuel Rodriguez-Orellana, Legal and Historical
Aspects of the Puerto Rican Independence Movement in the Twentieth Century, 60 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 567 (1991) (updating a 1988 published paper to include 1989-1991 develop-
ments on Puerto Rico's status in the U.S. Congress); Manuel Rodriguez-Orellana,
Quebec y Puerto Rico: Un hemisferio y dos soledades, 67 REv. JUR. U.P.R. (accepted for
publication 1998); Manuel Rodriguez-Orellana, The Relationship Between Puerto Rico
and the United States: Politics as Usual?, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS-A TIME OF
CHANGE: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICAN SAMOA, GuAM, THE
NORTHERN MARIANAS, PUERTO RICO AND THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS
(Boughton & Leary eds., 1993).
89 Glendon, Letter, supra note 73.
90 Id.
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In the current brisk international traffic in ideas about rights, Amer-
icans avail themselves less than they should, and less than many
other peoples do, of opportunities to reflect on their own contro-
versies in light of the experiences of others. Courts and legal schol-
ars in many other liberal democracies are quite knowledgeable and
sophisticated in their use of American and other legal materials.
The same cannot be said about their counterparts in the United
States, who all too often maintain a posture of indifference, disdain-
ful as it is ignorant, towards the approaches of other nations to our
shared economic, social, and environmental dilemmas. 91
Comparative law, as Professor Glendon's work suggests, should
begin to facilitate a deeper understanding of how other nations are
faring under evolving realities of self-determination. With trade ex-
pansion in a global economy, the study of human rights law from an
international and comparative perspective should help the United
States emulate Borges' approach in becoming "the other." While for
Latin Americans, it was necessary to become the "true Europeans,"
9 2
modernization has made it necessary for the multipolar world
spawned by the exercise of self-determination to become the "true
Americans," in the spirit of the 1776 Declaration of Independence.
If Mary Ann Glendon's new direction helps move the United
States along its own course of self-determination to relocate the mar-
gins of its receding hegemony, American legal scholarship may be one
basement step closer to catching a glimpse of its own aleph.
91 GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 19, at 158.
92 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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